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LECTURE
THE BRENDAN BROWN LECTURE*
THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD
COURT IN THE POST-"COLD
WAR" ERA
Richard B. Bilder*
In the wake of the decision of the International Court of Justice against
the United States about five years ago in the Nicaragua case,' the Reagan
Administration adopted a critical stance towards the Court-an attitude
which the Bush Administration has thus far maintained.2 I would like to
discuss whether, in the post-"cold war" world in which we are now living, a
continuation of this policy makes sense and is in the national interest.
* This Article is adapted from a lecture delivered on October 12, 1990, at the Columbus
School of Law, The Catholic University of America, as part of the Brendan Brown Lecture
Series. The Lecture Series honors Dr. Brendan Brown, the sixth dean of the Columbus School
of Law (1942-54).
** Burrus-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
The lecture is reprinted with minor changes made to accommodate the different form. Foot-
notes were added where the Law Review staff deemed them essential.
For more comprehensive discussion by the author of various topics discussed in this lecture,
see Bilder, An Overview of International Dispute Settlement, 1 EMORY J. INT'L DISPUTE RESo-
LUTION 1 (1986); Bilder, International Dispute Settlement and the Role of International Adju-
dication, 1 EMORY J. INT'L DISPUTh RESOLUTION 131 (1987); Bilder, International Third
Party Dispute Settlement, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 471 (1989); Bilder, Judicial Procedures
Relating to the Use of Force, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1991).
1. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27).
2. See, e.g., US. Decision to Withdraw from the International Court of Justice: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Comm. on For-
eign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985); U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Terminates Acceptance of
ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 67 (Jan. 1986) (Department Statement, Oct.
7, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985); U.S. Dep't of State, US. Withdrawal from the
Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the ICJ, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 64 (Mar. 1985) (Depart-
ment Statement, Jan. 18, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985); Sofaer, Adjudication in the
International Court of Justice: Progress Through Realism, 44 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 462 (June
1989).
Catholic University Law. Review
I. BACKGROUND: THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Let me first briefly describe the International Court of Justice--or "World
Court"-and how it works. The World Court, established by the United
Nations Charter as an organ of the United Nations, is governed by a special
treaty called the "Statute of the Court," which is annexed to the United
Nations Charter and to which all members of the United Nations are par-
ties. The Court consists of fifteen judges from different countries, elected by
the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council for staggered
terms of nine years each. The Court sits in a building called the Peace Pal-
ace in The Hague, the Netherlands. The judges are, of course, supposed to
act impartially and decide cases according to the rules of international law.
While the Court has some authority to give advisory opinions, its primary
function is to decide disputes between states. The catch is that the Court,
like all international arbitral or judicial bodies, can hear and decide disputes
only when the states involved consent to its jurisdiction; unlike the
mandatory jurisdiction which national courts exercise, the World Court has
no automatic compulsory jurisdiction. Before the World Court can hear and
decide a case, it must specifically find that all states before it have agreed to
the Court's exercise of jurisdiction.4
States may consent to the World Court's jurisdiction in several ways.
First, they may reach a special agreement providing for the Court to decide
a particular dispute, as the United States and Canada did in the Gulf of
Maine maritime boundary case.5 Second, they may agree in advance,
through a "compromissory clause" in a particular treaty, to let the Court
decide disputes involving that treaty; the United States persuaded the Court
to assert jurisdiction over Iran in the Tehran Hostages case on this basis.6
Finally, under the provisions of the "optional clause" of article 36(2) of the
Court's statute, any state that wishes to do so may, by filing a declaration in
advance, give the Court "compulsory jurisdiction" to decide its disputes
with any other nation that also has made such a declaration.7 Such parallel
declarations were involved in the Nicaragua case.
3. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 1, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 993.
4. Id. art. 36(2).
5. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12).
6. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3
(Judgment of May 24).
7. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36(2), 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, T.S. No. 993.
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The United States pioneered the idea of international adjudication as early
as the Jay Treaty of 1794 with the United Kingdom, which established sev-
eral arbitral tribunals.8 Nevertheless, the United States has, over the years,
shown a remarkable ambivalence towards international adjudication. As
Professor Tom Franck noted, United States policy has veered between "mes-
sianism," fired by a Utopian belief that the United States could lead states
into accepting the world rule of law, and "chauvinism," reflecting the United
States' countertendency towards "realpolitik" and its distrustful and skepti-
cal view of other states and international involvement.' Thus, in 1946,
under President Harry S. Truman, the United States filed a declaration ac-
cepting the court's compulsory jurisdiction under the "optional clause," but
did so with very broad reservations which some regarded as virtually nullify-
ing our acceptance.' ° Prior to the Nicaragua case, the United States was
involved as both plaintiff and defendant in several other cases before the
Court. The most important of these cases was the United States' suit against
Iran in the 1980 Tehran Hostages case, in which the court ruled for the
United States.
II. THE NICARAGUA CASE
Let me now briefly describe the history of the Nicaragua case. In April
1984, Nicaragua brought a case against the United States in the World
Court charging that United States' support of the contras, as well as a
number of other acts including the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, violated
United States' international legal obligations under the United Nations and
Organization of American States charters, a bilateral commercial treaty be-
tween the United States and Nicaragua, and customary international law.
Nicaragua claimed that the court had jurisdiction over the case both because
the United States and Nicaragua had filed declarations accepting the court's
jurisdiction under the "optional clause," and because a United States-Nica-
ragua commercial treaty still in force had a "compromissory clause" vesting
the court with jurisdiction over disputes involving the treaty. The United
States argued that the court lacked jurisdiction for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding (1) the fact that, several days before Nicaragua filed the suit, the
8. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, United States-Great
Britain, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 108.
9. See Franck & Lehrman, Messianism and Chauvinism in America's Commitment to
Peace Through Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 3 (L.F.
Damrosch ed. 1987).
10. Declaration by the President of the U.S. Aug. 14, 1946 respecting recognition by the
U.S. of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Int'l Court of Justice, Aug. 26, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218,
T.I.A.S. No. 1598.
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United States had amended its article 36(2) declaration to exclude specifi-
cally "Central American" issues, (2) the legal invalidity of Nicaragua's dec-
laration granting article 36(2) jurisdiction, and (3) the existence of certain
reservations to the United States' declaration that the United States believed
excluded the Court's taking the case. Interestingly, the United States also
argued that a dispute involving an ongoing military conflict was not "justici-
able" by the Court because the United Nations Charter vested authority
over such questions exclusively in the Security Council, and because the case
involved issues such as claims of self-defense and evidentiary questions that
were inherently beyond the capacity of an international court to resolve.
Despite the United States' arguments, the Court held, by a substantial ma-
jority, that it had jurisdiction and that the matter was admissible and appro-
priate for judicial consideration."
The United States State Department strongly protested the Court's juris-
dictional decision. The Reagan Administration was so outraged that it an-
nounced that the United States would not participate further in the case and,
in particular, that it would not appear in the proceedings on the merits.1 2
Among other things, the United States charged that the Court's decision was
clearly incorrect and lacked legal basis, that the decision exceeded the
Court's appropriate authority, and that the Court was politically influenced
and biased. Moreover, the Reagan Administration indicated that, as a con-
sequence of the case, it was reviewing the 1946 United States Truman Decla-
ration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under article 36(2)
of the Court's statute. As a result of this review, on October 7, 1985, the
State Department announced that the United States had terminated its Dec-
laration submitting to the compulsory jurisdiction of the court under article
36(2). 13
Despite the United States' nonappearance in the final phase of the case,
the court, pursuant to its Statute, proceeded to a hearing on the merits. On
June 27, 1986, the Court issued its judgment on the merits, finding that
United States support of the contras, as well as certain other actions against
11. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392, 442 (Judgment of Nov. 26 concerning Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of
the Application).
12. See U.S. Dep't of State, US. Withdrawalfrom the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua
in the ICJ, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 64 (Mar. 1985) (Department Statement, Jan. 18, 1985), re-
printed in 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985).
13. See U.S. Dep't of State, US. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction,
86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 67 (Jan. 1986) (Department Statement, Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in 24
I.L.M. 1742 (1985).
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Nicaragua, such as the mining of its harbors, violated international law.14
The Court withheld, for further determination, the amount of damages to be
awarded.
Under the United Nations Charter and Statute of the Court, the United
States appeared obligated to comply with the judgment. Nevertheless, the
Reagan Administration, vetoing a Security Council resolution calling upon
it to comply, indicated that it did not intend to recognize the decision.15
Currently, the status of the case is more or less unchanged. Nicaragua's
claim for more than two billion dollars in damages is still pending before the
court, but Nicaragua has asked for a postponement of further proceedings in
this respect. The United States has reportedly put considerable pressure on
the new Chamorro Administration in Nicaragua to completely withdraw the
case from the court, but President Chamorro risks substantial internal polit-
ical criticism if she decides to do so.16 My guess is that, ultimately, the
United States and Nicaragua will achieve some kind of settlement in which,
as part of an overall bargain that may include substantial economic assist-
ance, Nicaragua will withdraw the case. Such a solution would draw on the
precedent of the United States-Iran experience in which the United States, as
part of the settlement reflected in the Algiers Accords, withdrew the Tehran
Hostages case, removing from Iran the obloquy of failing to comply with the
Court's judgment.17
Neither the Reagan nor, as yet, the Bush Administration has indicated
any interest in a possible United States reacceptance of the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court under article 36(2) even, as many international lawyers
have urged, with broad reservations that would seem amply to protect
United States interests.
III. THE RECENT WORK OF THE WORLD COURT
One of the most interesting developments in the last several years is that,
despite dire United States predictions that the Nicaragua decision would
broadly discredit the World Court and so discourage states from submitting
cases as to virtually end its usefulness, the Court has never been busier. The
14. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 146-50 (Judgment of June 24).
15. United Nations Security Council: Excerpts from Verbatim Discussing L C.J. Judgment
in Nicaragua v. United States, 25 I.L.M. 1337, 1352, U.N. Doc. 5/18250 (1986); see World
Court Supports Nicaragua After U.S. Rejected Judges'Role, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at Al,
col. 2; U.S. Voters Rebuke on Aid to Contras, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1986, at A3, col. 1.
16. U.S. Urges Nicaragua to Forgive Legal Claim, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1990, at A18, col.
1.
17. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,
20 I.L.M. 224, 227 (1981).
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court now has some eight cases on its calendar and recently finished dealing
with several other cases and advisory opinions, including the right of the
United States to close the Palestine Liberation Organization's office in New
York.1" The cases now pending include a dispute between Norway and
Denmark concerning ocean boundaries in the Northern Ocean between
Greenland and Jan Mayen Island, 9 a dispute between Honduras and El Sal-
vador concerning boundaries in the Gulf of Fonseca (in which the Court has
just allowed Nicaragua to intervene),2" a dispute between Nauru and Aus-
tralia concerning the exploitation and removal of resources from the island
while under Australian administration,2 a recently filed and important terri-
torial dispute between Libya and Chad,22 a dispute between Guinea-Bissau
and Senegal concerning an arbitral award,23 and a case filed by Iran against
the United States for the downing of IranAir Flight 655 in the Persian Gulf
by the U.S.S. Vincennes during the Iran-Iraq war.24
Another interesting development is that many of the cases recently before
the court have been submitted, as permitted by the Court's rules, to special
panels of five judges agreed upon by the parties. The 1984 United States-
Canada Gulf of Maine case, 25 the 1985 Burkina Faso-Mali Frontier Dispute
case, 2 6 the 1987 United States-Italy Elettronica Sicula case,27 and the recent
1988 Norway-Denmark Jan Mayen case are examples.28 Certainly, the
panel concept, which the United States strongly favors, has proved popular.
Arguably, any such device that makes states more willing to submit cases to
the Court is beneficial. On the other hand, if most states choose only to use
18. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 26)
(brought before the World Court by the United Nations General Assembly on Mar. 2, 1988).
19. Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v.
Nor.), 1988 I.C.J. 66 (Order of Oct. 14) (brought before the World Court by Denmark on Aug.
16, 1988).
20. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1990 I.C.J. 92 (Judg-
ment of Sept. 13) (submitted by joint notification dated Dec. 11, 1986).
21. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1989 I.C.J. 12 (Order of July
18) (brought before the World Court by Nauru on May 19, 1989).
22. Libya, Chad Seek Ruling, Fin. Times, Sept. 4, 1990, at 1.
23. Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), 1990 I.C.J. 64 (Order of
Mar. 2) (brought before the Court by Guinea-Bissau on Aug. 23, 1989).
24. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1990 I.C.J. 86 (Order of June 12)
(brought before the I.C.J. by Iran on May 17, 1989).
25. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12).
26. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Judgment of Dec. 22).
27. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (Judgment of July 20).
28. Maritime Delimination in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v.
Nor.), 1988 I.C.J. 66 (Order of Oct. 14) (brought before the World Court by Denmark on Aug.
16, 1988).
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such specially selected panels, the World Court could become a series of ad
hoc arbitral tribunals sitting at a common seat, rather than remaining a
"World Court." To the extent the use of panels may tend to erode the con-
cept and integrity of the court as a global institution, or encourage the idea
that international judges are inherently biased, there could be reason for seri-
ous concern.
IV. THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE WORLD COURT
I would like, however, to raise some broader questions. Does it really
make much difference what attitude the United States Administration takes
towards the Court? Is the World Court, or more generally, international
adjudication, really important to the viability of the international legal or-
der? In terms of our national interest, should we really care whether the
Court is widely used or whether it is strengthened or weakened and, if so,
why?
A. Arguments for a Limited Role
Many people argue that the court plays only a relatively limited role in
international affairs and that its importance to the United States or interna-
tional law should not be exaggerated. Consequently, in their view, the
United States can gain nothing from supporting the court that would be
worth the risks involved-risks that are all too real, as Nicaragua shows.
Four of the arguments they make in support of their position are discussed
below:
First, as indicated in article 33 of the United Nations Charter, resort to
the World Court or other types of international adjudication is only one of
many ways of dealing with disputes; other ways include negotiation, inquiry,
mediation, conciliation, or resort to regional agencies or the United Nations.
The predominant, best, and most effective way of trying to settle differences
is through negotiation directly between or among the states concerned-and
that is the way most disputes are, in fact, settled.
Second, adjudication is often not even a very good way of settling disputes
because it has many potential disadvantages, both for the parties and for the
international community. For example, adjudication is unpredictable and
involves the risk of losing; it may result in a superficial or illusory settlement;
it can be inflexible; it is complex and costly; it may not be impartial; and it
may not be enforceable. Indeed, sometimes adjudication can make matters
worse rather than better. Consequently, it is not surprising that, while na-
tions often pay lip service to the ideal of judicial settlement, in practice they
1991]
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have entrusted few significant disputes to the International Court or to other
international tribunals.
Thus, since the court was established in 1946, it has handed down only
about fifty judgments in contentious cases and less than twenty advisory
opinions, or less than two decisions or opinions per year. And many of these
cases have been of relatively limited importance. Often, when the court has
sought to assert jurisdiction over a significant matter that one party to the
dispute has not wished the Court to deal with, the defendant state has re-
fused to appear or to comply with any judgment rendered. This refusal to
accept the court's jurisdiction occurred in several recent cases including the
United Kingdom-Iceland Fisheries Jurisdiction case,29 the Tehran Hostages
case, 30 and the 1984 Nicaragua case. 3I Thus, if nations really do not want
the Court to settle their dispute, they will make it very difficult for the Court
successfully to do so.
Moreover, nations are particularly loath to commit themselves in advance
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the court under the "optional clause." At
present, only about fifty states, or less than one-third of the world's nations,
are bound by declarations under article 36(2), and many of these nations are
bound only with broad reservations. Among the great powers, only the
United Kingdom still has such a declaration in effect. It should be noted,
however, that states are more prepared to agree to "compromissory clauses"
within the confines of particular treaties; well over 200 treaties presently
contain such clauses, of which more than sixty are applicable to the United
States.32
Third, we should not fall into the error of thinking that we cannot have
real international law and an effective international legal order unless, as in a
national legal system, we also have courts exercising compulsory jurisdic-
tion. For one thing, the international political system is very different from
national political systems, and it is simply not the case that every functioning
legal system must work the same way. As indicated, there are many ways of
settling disputes, and arguably, the international legal order can effectively
deal with such differences without compelling states to submit to the com-
29. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25).
30. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3
(Judgment of May 24).
31. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26 concerning Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the
Application).
32. See, e.g., Charney, Compromissory Clauses and the Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 855 (1987); Morrison, Treaties as a Source of Jurisdiction,
Especially in U.S. Practice, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS
58, 79 (L.F. Damrosch ed. 1987).
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pulsory jurisdiction of international courts. Further, even in national legal
systems, it is becoming increasingly clear that courts play a different and less
important role than we traditionally thought; indeed, one of the principal
functions of courts is probably to spur negotiated settlement.
Finally, in the presence of nationalism and sovereignty, and in the absence
of broadly shared global values, there is a possibility of bias; the risks of
entrusting national interests to foreign judges are more than many countries
may be willing to accept. Consequently, for now, the idea of general com-
pulsory adjudication inevitably is more aspiration than reality.
B. Arguments for a Broader Role
A strong case, however, can be made for greater United States support for
the World Court. First, while adjudication may not be the best way of
resolving every, or even most, international disputes, it has a number of po-
tential advantages. For example, adjudication is dispositive and ideally, at
least, puts an end to the dispute; it is impersonal, permitting the parties to
"pass the buck" of responsibility for unfavorable outcomes to the tribunal; it
is usually principled, impartial, and orderly; it can "depoliticize" a dispute
and "buy time" for the parties; and it can provide broadly useful social rules
and reinforce the legal system. Simply by being available, the World Court
and other tribunals can help avoid, or induce the settlement of, disputes.
Thus, even if states rarely choose to invoke "compromissory clauses" or the
"optional clause," that does not mean such commitments are useless. On
the contrary, the possibility of allowing either party to resort to impartial
settlement will often give more incentive to negotiated settlement and mean
that that parties' bargaining will be more likely to occur in the shadow of the
law.
Second, there are a number of situations in which adjudication, by the
World Court or otherwise, seems likely to perform a particularly useful
function. In practice, most disputes do not involve issues of significant na-
tional interest; while each party may prefer to win, each can afford to lose.
Moreover, by agreeing to settlement by the World Court, disputing nations
can achieve at least one important objective-they can get rid of the dispute.
The World Court may be especially helpful in the following types of
disputes:
(1) disputes in which governments are indifferent to the outcome,
but for internal political or other reasons are unable to concede
or even compromise the issue in negotiations-for example,
minor boundary or territorial disputes; in this case, the coun-
tries can "pass the buck" to courts, and, if they lose, say:
"Don't blame me-blame the judge!";
1991]
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(2) disputes involving difficult factual or technical questions in
which the parties may be prepared to compromise but, because
of the complexity of the situation, cannot easily and without
impartial help evolve a basis for doing so;
(3) some particularly politically awkward or volatile disputes in
which resort to the court may allow parties to buy time in
hopes that things might "cool off."
Many of the cases most recently brought before the World Court are of these
types. For example, more than six of the cases brought to the Court since
1984-about two-thirds of all cases brought in this period-involve complex
issues of maritime or territorial boundaries--questions on which the Court
generally has done a good job.
Third, for many people throughout the world, international adjudication
and the World Court symbolize civilized and ordered behavior and the rule
of law in international affairs. Whatever the practical importance of the
Court may be in fact, most people think the Court is significant; people tend
to judge both the United States' commitment to international law and the
respect that international law seems to deserve by the respect that the United
States shows the Court. Thus, if the United States thinks its national inter-
est will be furthered by wider global respect for international law and wants
to be viewed as a supporter of international law, it may have difficulty doing
so if it is, at the same time, refusing to support--or belittling or "trashing"-
the Court.
What does this add up to? Realistically speaking, the World Court is
likely to play only a limited role in international dispute settlement for some
time to come. States are simply not yet prepared to take the risks of ac-
cepting binding third-party dispute settlement in all disputes affecting their
vital interests. States have many other ways of dealing with disputes. Cer-
tainly, in the wake of Nicaragua, it would be unrealistic to expect the United
States to take any dramatic initiative in this regard.
Even if the World Court is not a panacea for problems of world order, it
can be a very useful tool in our toolbox of international dispute settlement
techniques. The United States should keep the Court available and in good
shape for use by the United States or others when needed. Moreover, it is
important to keep the symbolic impact of the United States' support, or lack
of support, for the Court in mind-both on how the international commu-
nity views the Court itself, and on how the international community views
the United States' attitude towards international law. Consequently, the
United States seemingly has little to gain from weakening or trying to humil-
iate the Court, or from not using it when such use would otherwise serve the
United States' national interest.
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C. Current Negotiations Among the Permanent Members
of the Security Council
In this connection, let me mention one recent and important development.
In 1987, President Gorbachev proposed a variety of measures to strengthen
the role of international law and institutions in maintaining international
peace and security, including agreements among the United States, Soviet
Union, United Kingdom, France, and China-the Permanent Members of
the Security Council-to expand the World Court's compulsory jurisdic-
tion.33 The Soviet Union subsequently demonstrated its seriousness in this
respect by recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in six human
rights treaties to which it was party. The United States responded to this
initiative and, since July 1987, the two governments have been conducting
talks regarding cooperation to extend the Court's jurisdiction.
On September 23, 1989, as one of the outcomes of talks between Secretary
of State James Baker and Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadze, the two
governments issued a joint statement on this subject.34 The statement indi-
cated that the two governments have agreed that "it is desirable to enhance
the role of the Court in the resolution of international disputes in a manner
consistent with national security and other essential interests," 35 that they
jointly developed proposals for this purpose, and that the Permanent Mem-
bers of the Security Council should lead the way in seeking to carry out this
policy.
According to the statement, the proposals center around three general
ideas:
(1) relying on existing treaties to identify disputes to which they
apply;
(2) providing the opportunity to select a chamber chosen from
among the members of the full Court to adjudicate the dispute;
and
(3) excluding from the jurisdiction of the Court certain categories
of issues that are widely recognized to be highly sensitive to
states and inappropriate for resolution by judicial action in the
absence of express consent of the states involved.36
The United States and the Soviet Union have initiated consultations re-
garding these ideas with the other Permanent Members of the Security
33. Gorbachev, The Realities and Guarantees of a Secure World, Pravda, Sept. 17, 1987,
at 1, col. 1.
34. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE INITIA-
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Council "to develop a common approach to the jurisdiction of the Court
among the Five that can be embodied in an agreement open to all other
countries."3 7 The discussions have remained confidential and their exact
content and status are unknown. It is understood, however, that the discus-
sions contemplate a framework agreement, based on article 36(1) rather than
article 36(2) of the Court's statute, with an annex separately listing the spe-
cific agreements, or possibly categories of disputes, that the parties consent
to make subject to the Court's jurisdiction. Reportedly, it is contemplated
that the agreement would initially provide for the Court's jurisdiction over
disputes involving certain agreements relating to terrorism and the control
of narcotics.
The conclusion of such an agreement among the Permanent Members,
particularly if open to and joined in by other states, could influence interna-
tional dispute settlement and the work of the Court for years to come. Ac-
cording to a new report, however, the discussions recently ran "into
difficulties, with Britain and other critics contending that the initiative might
reduce the role of international law rather than enhance it."' 38 Nonetheless,
the negotiations are continuing.
While there is something to be said for any move by the United States and
other great powers to agree to submit even limited categories of disputes to
the Court, the usefulness of this current initiative remains questionable. In
particular, concerns exist regarding the agreement's apparently deliberate
bypassing of the accepted article 36(2) procedures, its stress on the use of
special chambers rather than the entire court, the likelihood that the agree-
ment will provide for broad and self-judging exclusions of "use-of-force" and
other cases from the Court's jurisdiction, and the agreement's consequent
potential for weakening, rather than strengthening, the Court and the con-
cept of international adjudication.
One can only hope that Congress and the public will urge the Administra-
tion to take another look at these negotiations to ensure that they advance
our national interests. In doing so, the Administration should take at least
the following considerations into account.
37. Id.; see, e.g., Soviets Urge Stronger Role for World Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1989,
§ 1 (International), at 4; Tentative Agreement Reached to Let World Court Settle Terrorism
Cases, Wash. Post, Aug. 8, 1989, at A14, col. 1; 2 Big Powers Back World Court Role, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 7, 1989, at A5, col. 1; Moscow Permits World Court Role, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3,
1988, at All, col. 1; U.S. Asking Soviets to Let World Court Settle Some Disputes, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 6, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
38. World Court Plan Meets Difficulties, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1990, § 1 (International),
at 9.
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First, the Administration should consider the great importance to the
United States' national interest of supporting and strengthening interna-
tional law and institutions, including the Court. Second, because the current
United States position regarding the Court is influenced strongly by a single
unique experience, the Nicaragua case-with the passage of time, the offi-
cials particularly involved in that case, and the political context in which it
arose, it may be time to reevaluate the Nicaragua case's real significance and
implications. Third, United States-Soviet relations are at a cusp of history in
which unique and undreamed of possibilities for the development of interna-
tional law and institutions have emerged. There are strong indications that
the Soviet Union may now be prepared to take the risk of accepting broad
World Court justification over many types of disputes; if so, it would be
tragic for the United States to be the nation to prevent or impede such a
development. Finally, the Administration should consider the remarkable
development during the current Persian Gulf situation of a new and height-
ened appreciation, by the United States and many other world powers, of the
importance of international law and institutions, and of the stake of all na-
tions in their preservation and development.
V. CONCLUSION
In his address to a Joint Session of Congress on September 11, 1990, Presi-
dent George Bush noted:
A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to
peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human en-
deavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world
quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule
of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations
recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A
world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.
... America and the world must support the rule of law. And we
will.39
For the United States to resume its traditional support of the World Court
and the concept of international adjudication would be an important step
towards .implementing the President's promise.
39. Text of President Bush's Address to Joint Session of Congress, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12,
1990, at AI0.
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